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Protective systems failure can be catastrophic, and originates in management failure. These 
systems rely on a document-based approach, which involves handling disjointed artifacts that are 
expensive to maintain and may become inconsistent and obsolete. We propose a framework for 
managing process safety that pioneers the modeling of protective systems according to the tenors 
of model-based systems engineering (MBSE). The framework embeds management and 
governance, and harmonizes regulations and inconsistent industry guidelines. Potential users 
include enterprises and regulators in the chemical process safety industry and the energy sector. 
The framework starts the development of more sophisticated standards to prevent catastrophic 
protective systems failures. 
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1    Introduction 
Designing and operating protective systems is a major engineering endeavor, due to the intricacy 
and complexity of its technologically enabled physical components, the management system that 
supports them, and their wide variety of stakeholders. Furthermore, protective systems need to be 
constantly evolving, in order to remain effective as disruptive technologies emerge, and policies, 
regulation, operating conditions or requirements change. This constant evolution brings the 
additional challenge of management of change throughout their lifecycle. 
Every year, incidents happen in safety-critical companies throughout the world. While the majority 
of them are “near misses”, others have significant economic and moral implications, as they result 
in important business interruption costs, property damages, environmental damages, injuries and 
fatalities among both internal workers and external civilians who may or may not be aware of the 
risks imposed on them. Regulators and judges therefore require methods and tools to reduce the 
asymmetry of information, mitigate moral hazard, and induce preventive and protective measures 
while facing financial and informational constraints and dealing with a large number of agents. 
Seeking to deter the risk-creators and compensate the victims, they use ex post civil liability and 
ex ante safety regulation in its various forms: compliance-based regulation (prescriptive 
regulation), performance-based regulation, and process-based regulation (integral supervision). 
 
Many minor incidents have quickly escalated into major events, with poorly mitigated 
consequences (Marsh-Ltd, 2018). Although several other incidents with significantly less damage 
have the same root causes, all of the largest property-damage losses that have occurred in the last 
few decades in the hydrocarbon industry, were due to a simultaneous failure of various prevention 
and mitigation layers in the protective process-safety management system (Marsh-Ltd, 2014).  
 
The failure of protective systems can be catastrophic; and such failures are associated to 
management failure (Marsh-Ltd, 2018; Jarvis and Goddard, 2017; Summers and Hearn, 2012). 
Infrequent inspections, lack of preventive and corrective maintenance, faulty designs, lack of 
needed redundancies, the use of incompatible equipment, materials or protocols after a deficiently 
planned change, improper resource allocation, careless operation by personnel not properly trained 
or with excessive workload, and many other issues that can cause a major incident are originated 
in management. 
 
Nevertheless, managing protective systems requires more than ensuring compliance with practices 
and procedures. It is extremely difficult for several reasons, including not having enough historical 
data to analyze (Selvik and Abrahamsen, 2016) or being uncertain about whether systems indeed 
function properly in the fortunate absence of initiating causes. Models such as the safety pyramid, 
based on the work of H. W. Heinrich (Heinrich, 1941) and its extensions (Rebbitt, 2014), suggest 
that focusing on the underlying causes of near misses, where more data exists, can be useful to 
prevent serious incidents, as their underlying causes are essentially the same. While identifying 
and addressing the initiating causes of incidents is undeniably beneficial to advance process safety, 
if protective systems work as intended, the critical consequences of initiating causes can be 
prevented or mitigated. The usefulness of information provided by the study of near misses is 
limited, as it may not always be related to aspects affecting protective systems. 
 
Furthermore, the implications of a shared governance, the dynamic nature of technology and 
people in the system, as well as the multiple interactions among their elements, increase 
complexity. Safety is an emergent property (Leveson, 2013); this implies that elements that may 
be safe on their own, do not necessarily constitute a safe system once they interact with other 
components. As safety-critical technologies evolve and complexity increases, we need tools to 
improve our ability to manage them. 
 
Protective systems are often characterized by a group of protection layers, such as inherently safer 
design, control, supervisory, preventive, mitigative, barrier, limitation, and response (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2007), intended to reduce the frequency or consequence severity of 
hazardous events (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2001; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
2007; Crowl and Louvar, 2011). This representation, similar to the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation, proposed by Dante Orlandella and James T. Reason of the University of 
Manchester, is used in Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), whose primary purpose is to 
determine if there are sufficient layers of protection against a hazardous scenario to meet an 
organization’s risk tolerance criteria. Given that no layer is perfectly effective, sufficient protection 
layers must be provided to render the risk of the incident tolerable (Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, 2001; Dowell, 2011). Modeling protective systems based on their physical layers designed 
to prevent, and ultimately respond to a loss of containment in the presence of an initiating cause 
seems appropriate, but this approach is limited, as it does not encompass management issues, such 
as who the owners and operators of each layer are or who is accountable for them. When the same 
agent manages two or more layers, this makes them subject to common-cause failures, which 
makes the assumption of independence between layers is hard to achieve in practice. 
 
Advancing the efficacy of protective systems requires more than focusing solely on improving 
their physical components, as several engineering research works do; the way they are designed, 
but also managed and governed is key as well. The paradigm of High Reliability Organizations 
(HROs), by Todd LaPorte, Gene Rochlin, and Karlene Roberts, of the University of California, 
Berkeley, links management to safety (Roberts, 1990a; Roberts, 1990b; Roberts and Bea, 2001; 
Roberts and Libuser, 1993); however, that paradigm does not provide a model suitable for analyses 
and simulation, and does not encompass regulatory issues. While industrial associations, 
regulatory bodies, and other disciplines have done a remarkable work to offer guidelines and best 
practices involving management (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1994; Center for Chemical 
Process Safety, 1995; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1996; Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, 2007; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2008; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
2011), there are some inconsistencies among their publications, which complicates integration, 
and their work still relies on the traditionally used document-based approach. This implies 
handling and maintaining a large number of disjointed artifacts, which is expensive and time 
consuming; but more importantly, may lead to inconsistency and obsolescence, thus aggravates 
the problem of deficient management of change. 
 
MBSE is a relatively new approach, which emerged in the aerospace industry, that significantly 
reduces the limitations of its document-based counterpart, and has other benefits beyond 
maintenance, including traceability and impact analysis capabilities. It has been successfully 
applied in other technologies, but not yet in protective systems. 
 
Our work presents a framework that embeds governance in protective systems, and pioneers the 
modeling of the multiple dimensions of protective systems according to the tenors of MBSE. It 
harmonizes regulations, theories, and inconsistent industry guidelines; provides a realistic 
approach to manage multiple aspects of change; and offers traceability and visualization 
capabilities. 
 
2    MBSE 
2.1  What is MBSE? 
Systems Engineering (SE) has many definitions, as those given by the International Council on 
Systems Engineering (INCOSE) (Walden et al., 2015), the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
(Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2016), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) (NASA, 2007), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2016), among other institutions and authors. They often refer to an 
interdisciplinary approach or process to design, realize, manage, operate and retire successful 
systems, document and satisfy requirements, meet the user needs, while taking into account their 
socio-technical aspects. SE is seen as an effective way to manage complexity and change (Walden 
et al, 2015). SE approaches can be either document-based, or model-based. The document-based 
approach has many drawbacks, because it involves having many disjoint artifacts, which can easily 
become inconsistent and obsolete. In the model-based approach, the main artifact is an integrated, 
coherent, and consistent system model (Delligatti, 2014), which evolves and is refined using 
model-based methods and tools (Friedenthal et al., 2015).    
 
MBSE is “the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, 
analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and 
continuing throughout development and later life cycle phases” (Holt, 2004). The three pillars of 
MBSE are modeling languages, modeling methods, and modeling tools (Delligatti, 2014). 
Modeling languages are standardized mediums to communicate model elements and their 
relationships; modeling methods ensure model consistency; and modeling tools enable the creation 
of models with elements, relationships, and views, in such way that any change made to a model 
element on a diagram automatically propagates, instantaneously updating all the other diagrams 
where that element is displayed. 
 
MBSE practitioners commonly use the Systems Modeling Language (SysML). It originated from 
an initiative between the Object Management Group (OMG) and INCOSE in 2003, intended to 
adapt the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for systems engineering applications (Holt and 
Perry, 2014), allowing to represent the structure, the behavior, and the requirements of a system 
through nine types of diagrams. Block definition diagrams (BDD) display and categorize elements 
and their relationships. Internal block diagrams (IBD) show the connections between the internal 
parts of a block and their interfaces. Parametric diagrams (PAR) express constraints using 
equations and inequalities. Package diagrams (PKG) display the organization of the model as a 
package containment hierarchy. Requirements diagrams (REQ) use texts to display requirements, 
and how other model elements satisfy, verify and refine them. Activity diagrams (ACT) depict the 
transformation of inputs into outputs and the flow of control through a sequence of actions. 
Sequence diagrams (SD) specify interactions among blocks via operation calls and asynchronous 
signals. State machine diagrams (STM) specify the states of a block and possible state transitions 
in response to event occurrences. Use case diagrams (UC) illustrate the actions that a system 
performs, as well as the actors that invoke and participate in them (Delligatti, 2014). 
 
2.2  Benefits of MBSE 
Modeling a system is useful in characterizing existing systems, designing new systems, conducting 
impact assessments, and training its operators and maintainers (Friedenthal et al., 2015). Modeling 
helps to address complexity, lack of understanding, and poor communications. When applied 
effectively, MBSE is a formidable approach to manage complexity and increase the understanding 
of a system, and brings important benefits such as consistency, coherence, traceability, a common 
language that improves communication, as well as the automatic generation and maintenance of 
system documents (Holt and Perry, 2014). The diagrams and texts used in this approach are views 
of the underlying system model, not the model itself (Delligatti, 2014), thus, they communicate 
different aspects of the system model, such as its structure, behavior, requirements, at different 
levels of granularity, and may suit the information needs of different audiences, while remaining 
consistent and integrated. 
2.3  MBSE and safety 
SysML has been employed successfully in the aerospace and defense industry (D’Ambrosio and 
Soremekun, 2017), with safety applications, particularly during the design phase. Jensen and 
Tumer (Jensen and Tumer, 2013) used SysML to evaluate the safety of a system under critical 
event scenarios involving one or more component failures in the design stage of a maneuvering 
system for a satellite. They included in their system model the object view for the software and 
hardware components, the view of function for their behavior, and a third view called “safety 
functions”, referring to the property of a system to resist moving from a hazardous state to an 
mishap state, essentially describing protective systems in a broad sense. The use of SysML 
extensions has been proposed for improving the modeling of mechatronics specificities such as 
interconnection components and multi-physical interactions in an Electro-Mechanical Actuator for 
aeronautics industry (Mhenni, Choley, and Nguyen, 2015). The use of MBSE with SysML has 
also been proposed for handling the increased complexity of the automotive industry (D’Ambrosio 
et al., 2017).  
3    Conceptual Model of Protective Systems 
Our conceptual model of protective systems, depicted in Figure 1, shows the broad, interrelated 
elements that constitute a protective system. Together, they provide a baseline for the structure of 
our MBSE framework, referred to as the “system model”. 
 
Figure 1. A conceptual model of protective systems. 
3.1  Model elements 
The physical components (A) such as sensors, alarms, relief devices, dikes, water curtains, and 
emergency shutdown systems, for instance, are present in the preventive, mitigative, barriers, and 
limitation layers of protection. Physical components are supported by a management system (B) 
that includes operating procedures, control systems, monitoring and supervision activities intended 
to prevent hazardous events and correct anomalies. Management of change, design procedures, 
documentation, hazard assessment, processes for reviewing and preserving equipment integrity, 
human factors, training, audits, incident investigation, and emergency response, among others, are 
activities of major importance that belong to the management system. Industry standards and 
guidelines such as those from the CCPS of the AIChE (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2007), 
serve as a basis for their identification. This element encompasses the structure, processes and 
resources contained in the inherently safer design, control, and supervisory layers, but also the 
management part behind the responsive layer. The management system provides the structure, 
processes and resources to establish the operating policy (C), which must comply with the 
applicable laws and regulation (D). The stakeholders (E) can be classified into three categories: 
internal, external involved, and external affected. The internal ones belong to the company and 
actively participate in the design, operation and management of the protective system. While the 
external agents do not belong to the company, some are involved in such activities (e.g. 
manufacturers, first responders, regulatory authorities), whereas others are not, but can be affected 
by protective systems failure (e.g. near neighbors). 
 
The lifecycle (F) acknowledges that there are various stages that depend on and build upon each 
other over time. For that reason, the system model artifacts need to show in what stages certain 
activities occur. The outputs of each stage may become the inputs for the subsequent, which 
implies that they will inherit characteristics, consequences of decisions or issues to address. When 
referring to the lifecycle, many SE approaches have a “cradle-to-grave approach”, defining it as 
the entire spectrum of activity, from the identification of needs to the system retirement and 
material disposal (Blanchard, 2008), including the stages of observation, 
failing/concern/opportunity awareness, development, transition, operation, maintenance, 
enhancement, overhaul, decommission, and disposal. Conversely, the CCPS organizes the 
protective management system lifecycle in seven phases: (1) planning, (2) risk assessment, (3) 
design, (4) engineering, (5) installation, commissioning, and validation, (6) operational and 
mechanical integrity, and (7) continuous improvement (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
2007). While the activities of abandonment of outdated practices and decommission and disposal 
of obsolete or worn out materials are still implicit in the last two stages, this concept of lifecycle 
phases is consistent with the evolving nature of protective systems, and follows a “cradle-to-
cradle” approach, which is the one we chose for our model. 
 
3.2  Interactions among elements 
Besides presenting a structural decomposition of the main types of elements of a protective system, 
it is important to understand some interactions and dependencies depicted by the arrows in the 
conceptual model. No individual has full visibility of the whole complex system, and yet, changes 
in one element could affect others as well. The needs of the stakeholders are refined into 
requirements for the physical components and the management system. Internal stakeholders can 
determine policy, and some external stakeholders may affect laws and regulation. Both types of 
stakeholders may be affected by protective system failure. Internal stakeholders, as well as the 
external involved, possess more information about the protective system compared to the 
remaining external stakeholders, as the former work together to design and operate it. 
Nevertheless, the external stakeholders who are involved, such as the regulatory authorities and 
the citizen participation groups who represent the near neighbors, can take into account the 
interests of the external affected stakeholders. These interactions can prevent or mitigate 
asymmetry of information issues. 
 
The management system (B) supports the physical components (A) and establishes the operating 
policy (C), which must comply with the applicable laws and regulation (D). The arrow that 
connects (B) and (C) illustrates that unidirectional dependency. Given that policy does not 
automatically change when the regulation does, the model does not include an arrow connecting 
(D) and (C). Instead, laws and regulation can affect the internal stakeholders who are able to 
change policy directly, and the stakeholders who create or modify laws and regulations can affect 
the management system that establishes policy.    Also, the graphical representation of (B), (C) 
and (D) as various layers, with (D) as the outer layer reinforces the idea of compliance. Presenting 
(B) as the base for (A) conveys the idea that the management system supports the physical 
components. The arrows that connect each lifecycle stage represent how stages depend on and 
build upon each other. The feedback from the “maintain and improve” stage to the “design” stage 
is consistent with the cradle-to-cradle philosophy. Given the very low level of granularity in our 
broad conceptual model, the specific interactions between (F) and (E) are not shown; however, 
other artifacts in the detailed system model developed after it should indicate what stakeholders 
participate in each lifecycle stage. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, the conceptual model does not show the possible interactions among 
elements of the same type, but these clearly exist and must be included in the system model. 
Physical components interact among themselves: sensors provide inputs for logic solvers and final 
elements; closing a valve on the discharge of a pump may result in pump damage; opening a 
pressure control vent valve may affect the amount of released gases that incinerators or flares will 
need to burn. In the management system, new operating procedures, as well as lessons to learn 
revealed in incident investigations and audits, have to be communicated in the form of training to 
personnel and contractors; hazard analysis or evaluation require process safety information, and 
changes in any element need to be assessed and approved by management of change.  
 
3.3  The dynamic nature of protective systems 
Protective systems have a dynamic nature. They must respond to the new demands from the safety-
critical technologies they are intended to protect, which evolve over time. Their physical 
components wear out and become obsolete as technology advances, personnel turnover demands 
training and documentation, laws and regulations are amended, the needs and requirements of the 
different types of stakeholders change, affecting the management system and the operating policy. 
Change is constant and inevitable. Failing to manage it effectively can compromise the efficacy of 
protective systems.  
4    Results and discussion 
4.1  A computerized model in SysML 
Based on our conceptual model of protective systems that encompasses the physical components, 
the management system that supports them and determines the operating policy, which must be 
consistent with laws and regulations, and has different stakeholders participating throughout its 
lifecycle, we created a computerized model, referred to as “the system model”. We used the 
modeling language SysML, and the software NoMagicMagic Draw 18.3 with its SysML Plugin, 
and the Paramagic Plugin for simulation purposes. This model details each broad category of 
elements in order to show their structure and behavior, as well as the relations and interactions 
among them. It consists of more than 500 blocks, 74 activities, 49 packages, 31 requirements, 77 
use cases, and 7 views and viewpoints, sketched in over 65 diagrams. The full diagrams are 
available from the authors upon request. For its design, we used information extracted and adapted 
from the CCPS guidelines and Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Process Safety 
Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (OSHA PSM) (U.S. Department of Labor. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2000). 
4.1.1  LOPA as one of many views of the system model 
 
According to the MBSE approach, the diagrams and other system artifacts are simply views of the 
system model. They reveal portions of the model at specific levels of granularity. Our system 
model presents the current characterization of protective systems, which consists of a group of 
protection layers used in LOPA, as one view of protective systems. Figure 2 conveys the idea that 
the protection layers, which are inherently safer design, control, supervisory, preventive, 
mitigative, barriers, limitation, and response, can be affected by initiating causes, such as 
instrumentation failure, equipment failure, an external event, human error, or utility failure. While 
this broad representation may be useful to illustrate the main idea behind LOPA, many other views 
in our model system provide greater detail regarding the structure, behavior, and relationships 
between each type of the many elements of a protective system. 
 
 
Figure 2. Protection layers and initiating causes. 
 
Diagram 1 shows a BDD with the taxonomy of the protection layers. It presents the generalization 
between devices and the type of protection layer into which they can be classified. Generalizations 
show that the subtype is a type of a supertype. This is useful, as all the properties assigned to a 
supertype are inherited to the subtypes, whereas those from the subtypes are only specific to them. 
Diagram 2 has a taxonomy of the initiating causes and displays an accepted definition of each for 
documentation purposes. Diagram 3 provides further details regarding generalizations, composite 
associations, reference associations and dependencies of such protection layers. In other words, it 
conveys structural decomposition, depicts existing connections and possible unidirectional or 
bidirectional accesses among certain elements, and the notion that whenever one element changes, 
others stated there may change as well. 
 
 
Figure 3 corresponds to a portion of Diagram 3, which illustrates that the process alarms have both 
hardware and software, and that changes to alarms hardware may affect alarms software. It also 
shows that process alarms, as well as basic process control systems, belong to the Control 
protection layer. Another portion, depicted in Figure 4, exposes the unidirectional connections 
among pressure relief devices with knockout drums, condensers and incinerators; pressure relief 
devices and vents; scrubbers and vents; and scrubbers and flares. It also shows the factors that 
determine the necessary height of the elevated flares: the stack diameter, the distance from the base 
of the flare, the desired heat intensity, the vapor rate, and the molecular weight of the vapor, each 
one with their respective units. The corresponding equations, which appear as constraints, are 
embedded in the model through the use of PAR. Diagram 4 complements Diagram 3 by revealing 
the functions that these types of mechanical equipment perform in a relief system, in an ACT. A 
portion of it is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 3. Portion of BDD in Diagram 3 showing process alarms. 
 
 




Figure 5. Portion of ACT in Diagram 4 showing the functions performed by some mechanical 
equipment. 
 
4.1.2  Physical components 
 
Many of the elements that constitute the protection layers are physical components. Because of 
these generalizations, defined in Diagram 5, the structural and behavioral features assigned to the 
block of physical components are inherited automatically, by transitivity, to all the subtypes. 
Further properties are assigned only to specific subtypes. Figure 6 illustrates that all physical 
components have maintenance procedures, installation procedures, and inspection and testing 
procedures; but only specific physical components have other properties: mechanical equipment 
has piping and instrument diagrams; various types of pressure relief devices, which are a subset of 
the mechanical equipment, have a relief system design. 
 
Figure 6. Selected physical components with properties assigned at various levels. 
 
 
4.1.3  Management system 
 
The management system that supports the physical components is represented in our system model 
in Diagrams 6 through 20, in order to display the various elements present in OSHA PSM, as well 
as their respective components, which were modeled as parts. Figure 7 shows them summarized, 
in the form of one block, with its elements displayed as part properties. In Diagram 21, an IBD 
details the information and objects that flow across the elements of the management system, which 
reveals possible interactions among themselves. A portion of it can be found in Figure 8. 
Management of change (MOC) is one of the main components of the management system. Given 
the multiple interactions that MOC has with other components, as well as its major importance in 
process safety, it deserves special attention. Our model includes a section related to MOC systems, 
based on the CCPS guidelines for the management of change for process safety (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2008). Diagram 22 displays various packages with the inputs and outputs 
to and from MOC, such as the package in Figure 9. Diagrams 23 through 32 illustrate diverse 
aspects of MOC, from the commitment required from management to allocating resources and 
providing training to those involved in activities derived from or affected by changes, the key 
principles and essential features of MOC, the activities of MOC decision structure, or the tasks 
that should be performed during the design and development lifecycle stages in order to create a 
MOC system, to the roles that internal stakeholders play in MOC, the steps followed during MOC, 
and details about the request for change review and approval procedure. Figure 10, Figure 11, and 







Figure 7. Block of the management system. 
 
 








Figure 10. Portion of the BDD in Diagram 29 depicting the roles in MOC and the stakeholders 
who play them. 
 
Figure 11. Portion of the SEQ in Diagram 31 depicting the steps followed during MOC and the 
interactions among the people playing each role. 
 
 
Figure 12. Portion of the ACT in Diagram 32 depicting the Request for change review and 
approval procedure. 
 
4.1.4  Policy, laws and regulation 
 
The policy element from our conceptual model is included in the system model in various ways. 
The operating procedures part of the management system, detailed in Diagram 16, encompasses 
many aspects of policy, such as the steps required to correct or avoid deviation in the operating 
limits, the engineering controls and the administrative controls established in safer work practices, 
failure responses, compensating measures and procedures to apply in the event that a shutdown 
fails. Another way to represent policy is through the information that flows across the parts of the 
management system, since it includes procedures (e.g. inspection procedures, maintenance 
procedures) and criteria (e.g. risk tolerance criteria, criteria for applying procedures). Some blocks 
from the taxonomy of the protection layers are also elements of policy. 
 
Policy, laws and regulations also appear in our model in the form of requirements. Requirements 
may be represented as tables, as part of block diagrams, or as REQ. We also used use cases, with 
their corresponding activity diagrams, to illustrate courses of action, as in Figure 13. Various 
relationships among requirements and other model elements, such as containment, trace, derive 
requirement, refine, satisfy, and verify, provide greater detail and further properties regarding how 
those requirements are fulfilled or can be traced in the system. In Diagrams 35 and 36 we included 
examples of applicable laws and regulation, such as OSHA PSM, the Toxic Substances Control 
Act II, the Risk Management Program of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA RMP), the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, in the form of requirements. A small 
portion of diagram can be found in Figure 14. Diagram 37 is a REQ that also shows some use 
cases and blocks to depict the core attributes of the protection layers. A portion of it is shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 13. Policy depicted with a requirement and a use case. 
 
Figure 14. Portion of a REQ exemplifying laws and regulations modeled as requirements. 
 
Figure 15. Portion of Diagram 37 illustrating the use of requirements and use cases to include 
policy, laws and regulation in the system model. 
 
4.1.5  Lifecycle 
 
The lifecycle is represented in the system model in various views. The first one, presented in 
Diagram 38 and Figure 16, shows the lifecycle as an aggregate of various stages. An aggregate, in 
contrast to a composition, is not responsible for its parts (Weilkiens, 2007). The direct reference 
associations that link the stages convey the idea that they depend and build upon each other. The 
position of the arrowheads in the system model, as opposed to those from our conceptual model, 
do not stand for the chronological flow of information. Instead, according to the standards of the 




Figure. 16. Lifecycle stages. 
 
The lifecycle stages also appear in the model as partitions or swimlanes in Diagram 39, which 
corresponds to an ACT that allocates major activities to the lifecycle stage where they are expected 
to occur. The diagram shows the flow of information as object tokens, as well as the control tokens 
that enable subsequent activities. Each activity has inputs and outputs, which are not just texts; 
instead, they are referenced to blocks that may appear in other diagrams and reside in a specific 
repository. They have properties such as parts and references, and may have further capabilities 
suitable for analysis. Figure 17 shows a portion of Diagram 39. 
 
 
Figure 17. Portion of Diagram 39 depicting the allocation of activities within lifecycle stages. 
 
Diagram 40 contains a very large BDD that reveals further information about the inputs and 
outputs in Diagram 39, including their structural decomposition and the various lifecycle stages to 
which they are allocated, as some of them are inputs to more than one activity, or outputs from 
one activity and inputs to another. Diagram 41 contains the same elements as those in Diagram 40, 
but rearranged as a tulip, in such way that the blocks that appear at the core are those that are used 
in two or more lifecycle stages, and the blocks in the periphery are used only during one stage. 
This suggests that the elements at the core deserve more attention due to their greater importance 
and complexity in the system. These are: hazardous events descriptions, independent protection 
layers, instrumented protective function design basis, operability requirements, process safety 
information, reliability requirements, internal technical practices, functionality requirements, 
maintainability requirements, independent protection layers analysis report, equipment list, and 
detailed engineering specification. 
 
4.1.6  Stakeholders 
 
The stakeholders are presented in various diagrams. In Diagram 42 and Figure 18, they are 
classified, as in our conceptual model, into three categories: internal involved, external involved, 
and external affected. They appear as icons since the software tool allows it, but they are still 
blocks with their corresponding functionalities. Diagram 43 has a detailed taxonomy of 
stakeholders, which includes those mentioned in OSHA PSM (U.S. Department of Labor. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2000), Rasmussen’s framework (Rasmussen, 
1977), and various mismatching CCPS guidelines (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1994; 
Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1995; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1996; Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2004; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2007; Center for Chemical 
Process Safety, 2008; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2011). See Figure 19 for a portion of 
it. We used generalizations to allow the subtypes to inherit the properties assigned to their 
supertype. Diagram 44 is a PKG that summarizes the stakeholders that participate in each lifecycle 
stage, and their respective concerns, according to the guidelines for safe and reliable instrumented 





Figure 18. Protective system stakeholders. 
 
 
Figure 19. Portion of Diagram 43 depicting a taxonomy of stakeholders. 
 
 
Figure 20. Portion of Diagram 44 depicting stakeholders’ concerns through different lifecycle 
stages. 
 
SysML allows to model views and viewpoints. Views are packages that selectively import various 
diagrams, packages, model elements, etc., which constitute an aspect that is of interest to a 
particular set of stakeholders (Delligatti, 2014). Viewpoints specify the stakeholder, the concerns, 
the purpose, the languages, and the methods. Diagrams 45a and 45b present two ways in which 
the stakeholders’ views and viewpoints can be modeled. Not only do they show in which lifecycle 
phases they participate, allowing a visual comparison, but they also specify what model 
information is relevant to them. Figure 21 exemplifies the views and viewpoints of two 
stakeholders. Diagrams 46 through 52 detail packages that contain all the model elements allocated 





Figure 21. Views and viewpoints of two stakeholders importing packages. 
 
4.2 Tools for impact analysis and management of change 
 
Software tools that work with SysML can provide users, including designers, managers, and 
regulators, with tools for impact analysis and management of change. In the event we wanted to 
make a change in one of our model elements, it would be important to determine whether that 
change would impact other parts of the system. The software tool we have chosen can quickly 
identify in which diagrams the object appears, open them and show the element location, or 
navigate through the diagrams. Besides knowing the usage of a specific element in other diagrams, 
before making any changes to it, we need to identify what other model elements interact with it, 
and the kind of relationships that they have, in order to assess possible impacts. With the software 
modeling tool we used, it is possible to display in the current diagram the related elements from 
other diagrams, or display a list with the elements of the model that use it or depend on it. It is also 
possible to generate a dependency report in Microsoft Word, which will list all the model elements 
that have any kind of declared relation with the element, the type of relation, or if it is a connector 
that conveys information from one node to another. Although the dependency report can specify 
relations such as containment, dependency, allocation, association, direct association, aggregation, 
direct aggregation, composition, direct composition, generalization, and applied stereotypes 
including imports of packages, it does not show the direction of the arrows in the relations, that is, 
it does not specify whether the related element is a client or a supplier, and it does not display 
inherited relationships, that is, those assigned to a supertype. Nevertheless, these two limitations 
can be overcome by opening the specification of block properties for the desired blocks. 
    
Some alternatives provided by the tool are to generate either a dependency matrix in Microsoft 
Excel, or an allocation matrix in NoMagic MagicDraw. A portion of an allocation matrix is shown 
in Figure 22. These matrices display all the elements in the model in the first row and column 
vectors, and the existing relations among them in the appropriate entries. Models with many 
unrelated elements generate sparse matrices. Since both types of matrices have the same 
limitations from dependency reports, we recommend to use the specification of block properties 
in conjunction with the matrices. If the model only declares dependencies between elements A and 
B, and between elements B and C, the user of dependency reports, dependency matrices or 
allocation matrices may be able to infer that element C could be indirectly affected by element A. 
Having the big picture that these matrices provide can be beneficial for impact analysis and 




Figure 22. Portion of an allocation matrix 
 
4.3  A model and a method for impact analysis in the context of MOC 
 
One of the key principles and essential features of management of change is to evaluate possible 
impacts (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2008). Impact analysis requires a model and a 
method. The model of protective systems we have presented, which can be adapted to the 
characteristics of the industries where it will be used, offers the stakeholders tools to perform this 
activity. Its outputs include lists and matrices that show dependencies and other relations among 
its elements. The software functions allow the user to identify where each element is used.  
 
Our proposed method for impact analysis with our model recommends the following steps: First, 
use the software tools to identify where a model element is used, in order to ensure that a possible 
change that seems pertinent according to a diagram is indeed suitable in the remaining diagrams. 
Second, refer to the outputs of the model and check what are the other elements that have any 
dependencies or other declared relations with the element whose impact is being analyzed, and 
what kind of relation exists among them. If there are dependencies with other elements, the user 
should go further and identify the dependencies that those related elements have with other not 
already considered elements. Dependencies communicate that a change in the supplier element (at 
the arrowhead end) may result in a change to the client element (at the tail end). Therefore, the 
user must pay attention to the direction of the dependency to determine whether the element is a 
client or a supplier. 
 
4.4  Cross-sections, views and viewpoints for shared governance and multiple 
stakeholders 
 
Although many of the model elements are organized according to the lifecycle stages in which 
they occur, in order to be part of a model library that can be shared with the stakeholders involved, 
or be imported by another model that encompasses further aspects related to that time frame, in 
order to understand and address better the concerns of each stakeholder, regardless of the amount 
of lifecycle stages where they participate, it is possible and convenient to have a subset of the 
model that contains the parts that are relevant for them. The use of packages or package diagrams 
allows partitioning the model and presenting it as cross-sections, offering views that filter the 
model according to the point of view of each stakeholder, or specific aspects intended to address. 
 
A cross-sectional modeling style, combined with the capability of the modeling language to show 
many views and viewpoints, is beneficial in the context of shared governance, as it can help to 
specify and clarify the roles and responsibilities of each group of multiple stakeholders, understand 
the needs and concerns of other groups, and identify possible gaps. It is also possible to create a 
single view of the elements that two or more types of stakeholders have in common, in order to 
facilitate collaboration. Creating views that import selected packages only can allow external 
stakeholders to obtain the information they need to know, without giving them access to aspects 
of the company that should not be disclosed, such as classified information, confidential business 
information, and trade secrets. This approach can therefore mitigate asymmetry of information 
without compromising sensitive information. 
 
4.5  Implications of having a computerized model for maintenance 
 
With regard to maintenance, the MBSE approach offers many advantages compared to its 
document-based counterpart. Instead of having as system artifacts several disjointed manuals, 
spreadsheets and other text-based files that need to be updated every time the system changes, with 
the difficulties inherent to keeping track of all the places in which a modified element appears and 
the time and resources needed to ensure that all the documents are properly updated, at the risk of 
having inconsistencies among the updated and outdated artifacts, leading to the obsolescence of 
the latter if any misses occur, the MBSE approach that our model of protective systems follows 
allows a fast and inexpensive maintenance that prevents inconsistencies caused by leaving one or 
more artifacts outdated by mistake, as any changes made to an element of the model are 
automatically propagated to each and every place where that element appears. 
 
Nevertheless, this advantage also has its drawbacks. It is very dangerous to change an element of 
the model based solely on one of the diagrams where it appears, because all the other diagrams in 
which the element to update is present will instantly be modified as well, and perhaps the change 
may not always be desirable or compatible, or could impact other elements not previously 
considered. For that reason, besides being cautious about who is given the authority to modify the 
system model, as well as the timing for the updates, managers should always follow a proper 
procedure of management of change, which must include the impact analysis discussed earlier. 
The model should be updated only after the proposed changes have been evaluated and approved. 
Special attention must be paid at the moment of the update in case the change only took place in 
some instances of the model element, in order to adjust the model accordingly and avoid the 
modification of all the instances at once. For example, instead of renaming or modifying the 
properties of a block that is used in two or more diagrams, which would propagate the changes 
throughout all the diagrams where it is used, we recommend to replace the block subject to change 
only in the affected diagram with a new block with a different name and properties. 
 
4.6  Benefits for managers and regulators 
 
Managers can benefit from this model in many ways. It can lower the cost of system documentation 
maintenance; it provides tools for impact analysis and management of change; it can be used in 
training, and be used to increase awareness and understanding about the interactions and 
information flows among physical components, the management system, policies, procedures and 
requirements from laws, regulation, and recommendations from professional associations; the 
activities to perform during each lifecycle stage, with their corresponding inputs and outputs; as 
well as the notion of who the stakeholders are and what are their main roles an concerns. 
 
Besides acknowledging governments and regulators as stakeholders of protective systems, this 
model also provides them with tools to mitigate moral hazard and asymmetry of information, and 
perform activities related to loss prevention and the preservation of public safety. Regulators have 
the authority to enforce the adoption and use of protective systems, but they may also suggest, 
promote, or demand the use of MBSE to facilitate companies to comply with prescriptive 
regulation, such as those in OSHA PSM, EPA RMP, or any other applicable. The adoption of 
MBSE practices may also facilitate audits and inspections, since companies would be able to 
provide the authorities with the current status of the company regarding the implementation of 
protective measures, as well as their processes and equipment. Regulators may also benefit from 
this model as it may help them to keep in hand the specific needs and concerns of the near 
neighbors and general population they seek to protect, summarized and captured as the views and 
viewpoints of the external affected stakeholders. Also, having a model that illustrates the structure 
and behavior of the protective systems that companies use could help them determine what 
information they should request in order to mitigate moral hazard and answer questions to the 
public. At the same time, companies can satisfy the requests of regulators by creating packages 
with the information to disclose to external stakeholders, consistent to their concerns. 
 
5    Conclusions 
 
This work presents a MBSE framework that advances the state of the art in safety-critical 
protective systems, by integrating the management and governance dimensions. Our model is still 
consistent with the current characterization of protective systems as a group of protection layers 
used in LOPA, but it is also suitable for combined design, operation and regulation. It reduces the 
cost of maintenance of its artifacts and offers tools for impact analysis and management of change. 
Potential users include any agents invested in the design and management of protective systems, 
especially enterprises and regulators from the chemical process safety industry and the energy 
sector. This work significantly reduces the pitfalls of its document-based predecessors, by offering 
a visual, organic model with traceable, integrated and consistent elements, whose changes 
automatically propagate throughout every part where the modified element appears, instead of a 
set of disjointed texts, which are prone to errors, expensive to maintain, or may become 
inconsistent and obsolete as the system evolves. This framework encompasses the views and 
viewpoints of multiple owners, whose roles vary throughout the system lifecycle. Therefore, it 
supports shared governance, and can be used by multiple agents within and beyond the enterprise 
premises. While it mitigates information asymmetry, since all of its users share the same model, it 
also renders the possibility to provide its specific audiences with tailored views, at different levels 
of granularity, filtered according to their roles and concerns. Future publications about the 
simulation part of this work will encompass its computational and analytical capabilities, which 
may allow its users to comply with and support the development of both prescriptive and 
performance-based regulation. The multiple benefits that the use of MBSE standards provides to 
safety-critical companies and its many stakeholders, at a very low expense, support our conclusion 
that it should be a regulatory requirement for managing process safety. 
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